Searching for Gold in a Garbage Dump

 by

Dr. Rodolfo John Ortiz Teope

            

  He just doesn't know how to begin this piece. When he opens his inbox and sees a message from an element blaming him for every catastrophe that it believes is the result of his subsequent participation in its existence, his mind is filled with bewilderment. It is rather disappointing on his part that this aspect of the past posted malicious comments against his dignity and honor, failing to consider and investigate its involvement in the setback that it believed it was now facing. As much as he enjoyed going into depth about the story's contents, the penumbra of the heart forbids him from doing so for fear of complicating matters. Anarchy could result from these complications, mirroring the current political climate in the Philippines. He'd like to write the name, but he can't, so for the sake of mystery and obscurity, he'll refer to it as a “defective element.”

            We sometimes need to remain silent about our anger and hatred toward others, but staying silent does not imply that we are subjecting ourselves to mockery and guilt. Silence allows time to judge the ripple in life caused by a small rock. Everyone experiences waves in their lives, yet few realize it is simply a ripple. He doesn't blame this element for the problem; perhaps it lacks knowledge of socio-political physics. Life is so convoluted that we can't thoroughly understand it. Energy plays an important role in our daily lives. People who have a bitter and insecure attitude embody negative energy, while those who are joyful, cheerful, and strong-willed embody positive energy.

Associating with bad energies leads to a pessimistic view of life. Bitterness, wrath, and fury are all manifestations of negativity. Thus, he doesn’t blame this “defective element.” which he characterized as uttering disrespectful remarks, on him because it is surrounded by negative energy. The stubborn attitude will prevent us from accepting that the individuals around us may be bad energy. The worst part is that in such circumstances, they see positive people as devils in their lives, while negative individuals are guardian angels who are always there to help.

He usually says that if we have a problem, we contribute to it. We have troubles because we allowed it to happen. The worst-case scenario is when we fail to solve the problem. This fundamental mistake is attacking the problem rather than resolving it. He always looked at Romans 8:28, which states, "All things work together for good, according to God's purpose." This scripture is very helpful to him during difficult situations in his life. The mail in his inbox that disparages his dignity and respect is a blessing, if he may categorize it as such. The blessing lies in the fact that it presents a fresh challenge for him to prove that such derogatory comments about him represent a serious error.

To put it succinctly, the complexity of such a scenario will be discussed in the chapter on complex paradigms.  He wishes he could offer a more in-depth analysis of the personalities and the events that took place.  He will not interfere with Ripple's progress in any way.  The decisions we make in life shape our destinies.  Our destiny will be determined by energy, which may be either positive or negative.  There is no greater judge than the universe itself.  On the other hand, he has acquired valuable insights as a result of this extremely toxic experience.  Going through a garbage dump in quest of gold is a very challenging endeavor. 

#DJOT

 

An Analysis on China's Challenges Affected by the Russia-Ukraine War in Relation to the Territorial Claim of the West Philippine Sea

by

Dr. Rodolfo John Ortiz Teope

 

There is still bloodshed in Ukraine as a result of Russia's invasion. It's probably too early to draw any conclusions or give China any guidance because it's impossible to predict how this conflict will end at this point. After Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine in February 2022, nations imposed harsher sanctions on Russia; yet, it was evident that Putin still had a strong ally in Xi Jinping. Weeks before the full-scale invasion, the Chinese leader announced a "no limits" alliance with Russia, rejecting the sanctions and fortifying his relationship with Putin. The two leaders' economies have become more intertwined as a result of the war; last year, commerce reached record heights as Russia increased its imports of vital commodities from China and Chinese consumers snatched up cheap Russian petroleum. Russia's military industrial base is fueling its conflict in Ukraine, according to accusations made by the United States, and official data supports these claims with significant growth in related items. These products include machine tools and microelectronics. China has consistently maintained that its commerce with Russia is a normal aspect of their bilateral relationship. It further states that it takes a neutral stance toward the conflict and just seeks to bring about peace. Nevertheless, there is no denying that China has had to deal with a lot of difficulties as a result of Russia's actions and the international community's reaction. This paper will discuss the issues China is experiencing in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, with a focus on how it has affected China's action against the Philippines with regards to the territorial claim of the West Philippine Sea.

 

1. The complications between Russia and the western nations is a situation that China must consider with regards to a balance foreign policy.

 

China has been impacted by the war in Ukraine in a number of areas, including military, economic, political, and international relations. China has struggled to strike a balance in its foreign policy between Russia and the Western nations. China has refrained from characterizing Russia's assault on Ukraine as an “invasion” a move that has drawn harsh criticism from Western nations. Following a confidential meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, a joint statement from China and Russia said that the friendship between the two States has no limits. China's biggest trading partners, the United States and the European Union, must also be taken into account. Although it first adopted a largely pro-Russian posture, it appears to have gradually changed its mind in light of later events on the front lines. At the moment, China finds it dangerous to be too near or too far away from Russia.

China's party, government, and state-run media have all essentially adopted a Russian line on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, arguing that the major reason for the conflict is that Russia's security is at risk due to NATO's eastern expansion, which is being spearheaded by the United States. China has attempted to create a rift between the U.S. and Europe because it believes that the U.S. is supporting Europe's firm position toward Russia. Even Germany, which historically and strategically is wary of Russia, chose to forgo approving the economic developmental project in favor of continuing to support Ukraine militarily. China appears to have underestimated the robust solidarity and lightning-fast response of Europe and America to Russia's activities.

Although Xi Jinping continues to adopt a tough stance against the U.S., stability in its relations with Washington is China’s top priority. China wants to avoid becoming a target of U.S.-led international sanctions, and for now, even though it continues to offer diplomatic moral support to Russia, it has been refraining from providing military aid overtly. Although the U.S.-China confrontation has been a structural one in nature, China’s bottom line is probably to continue dialogue with the Biden administration in some way, if not to improve relations dramatically, at least to maintain a predictable and stable relationship.

 

2. The perspective of China on Present-Day International Affairs is a factor that needs to be revisited.

 

China does not see the current state of international relations as a major structural shift, but rather as the possibility that the war in Ukraine may have some impact on the current international order. China's basic position, which is based on its forecast of the long-term decline of US national power, its confidence as a major power with its rising national power, and its rivalry with the Western-centered international order through the expansion of its influence on the developing countries—of which there are a far greater majority than the advanced nations—has remained largely unchanged, despite its growing caution towards rapid changes in the international situation.

As an impartial matter, following the global expansion of the Covid epidemic, China's foreign relations, especially those with the West, were getting more hostile even prior to the war in Ukraine. In this period, the Biden administration has strengthened steps against China, including launching AUKUS and fortifying QUAD in Asia and the Pacific, and restored U.S. connections with its European allies, which were strained under the Trump administration. Invitations to the NATO meeting went out to Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan. China has protested these moves and expressed concern that they could turn into an Asian NATO. On the other hand, one may argue that Xi Jinping's firm foreign policy stance—which prompted the concerned nations to adopt a more confrontational posture—was the real cause of these acts.

China, meanwhile, does not necessarily believe that it is alone in the globe. It is assiduously following its national interest, abstaining from giving Russia military assistance, and applauding the fact that a large number of poor nations abstained from voting in favor of UN resolutions denouncing Russia. It is especially happy that China sent envoys on an unexpected visit to India a QUAD member, choosing not to impose sanctions against Russia.

 

3. The Fundamental Position of China territorial claim must be address properly.

 

For a while, there was debate over how China's claim to ownership of the West Philippine Sea, despite of a UNCLOS ruling allowing the Philippines to use the body of waters as its Exclusive Economic Zone, somewhat relates to Russia's reason of the invasion of Ukraine. These two situations do, after all, share two characteristics: democracies coexisting with more powerful authoritarian neighbors and the propensity of major power leaders to highlight ancestry and blood ties. However, the Ukraine issue is quite distinct from the China-Philippines issue from China's perspective because the West Philippine Sea is a part of China as the Chinese Government asserts based on historical facts.

To date, there is no convincing evidence that China's core long-standing attitude on claiming the West Philippine Sea has changed as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. One could argue that China will reconsider employing force in the West Philippine Sea given the challenges Russia faced shortly after the conflict in Ukraine began. The likelihood of China launching a unilateral armed invasion of the Philippines in the near future has decreased, as China now has a plethora of challenges and scenarios to weigh. Still, this is not the same as stating that China will abandon its claim to the WPS. It is still adamant about claiming WPS, regardless of how long this takes. Anyway, this determination to assert WPS will not be affected by economic sanctions.

Stated differently, the Chinese leadership views a Philippine invasion resulting from the WPS issue as a high-level political choice that goes beyond military and economic logic and impacts the future of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dictatorship. This is not a matter that is decided just by the evaluation of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) effective landing operation in the Philippines. That is to say, the Chinese leadership may still authorize an armed operation if they believe it is required, even in an undesirable scenario where military success is not certain and if delaying military action will have a significant negative impact on geopolitics or internal politics. It must be understood that if Philippines crosses the red line and fire the first bullet, China is ready to use force any time.

Regardless of the Ukraine war, the long-term gap in the military power of China and Philippines will continue to widen. From the Chinese leaders’ standpoint, time is on China’s side, so it can be argued that there is no need to take hasty military action. Even before the Ukraine invasion, there were actions by China which manifest that an invasion of Philippines could be imminent. However, discussions among security officials in the Philippines who need to prepare for the worst scenario in the future are not necessarily on the same dimension as the question of whether the Chinese leadership will indeed decide to launch an armed invasion.

Threat is the result of intent and capability, but as intent is difficult to discern from the outside and varies over time, capability is typically given more attention. Without a doubt, China has been acting more aggressively in the last few years, as seen by the PLA air force's regular breaching of the economic zone in the West Philippine Sea. Incorporate also the intermittent establishments of Philippine Offshore Gaming Operation (POGO) around the various Philippine provinces whose effect is highly damaging the peace and order of the country. However, the relationship between the United States and China over the Philippines remains a dynamic aspect of international politics.  China views the U.S.'s previously enforced self-restraint on the WPS issue as gradually eroding even with the Biden administration, as evidenced by the frequency with which U.S. naval vessels transit the Philippine seas and the expansion of the Enhance Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and the U.S. government exchanges with Philippine authorities at the governmental level. This will cause significant dissatisfaction among rightists and the Chinese military, which will put some pressure on Xi Jinping. Even to the conflict in Ukraine, tensions between the United States and China over the Philippines had been steadily rising. China also understands that, in contrast to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the prospect of American military action must be considered in the event of an invasion of the Philippines.

 

3. The military and economic takeaways of China once they decided to invade the Philippines.

 

China, however, has gained significant military and economic insights from the conflict in Ukraine. China was astounded by the challenges Russia encountered early in the conflict and its inability to secure a resounding victory. It seems to be annoyed that the conflict has made the Philippines more of a contingency in the eyes of the world and has increased awareness of defense issues in the country.

Even prior to the conflict in Ukraine, China was well aware of the difficulties and dangers associated with military activities in the West Philippine Sea. It is considerably more difficult to cross the West Philippine Sea and launch a landing operation than it is for Russia, which is invading Ukraine across a national border via land. China needs to accomplish its takeover and achieve a clear victory quickly in order for the world community to react, if it decides to use military force. Additionally, even after occupation, long-term resistance is anticipated to persist in the Philippines. China has seen firsthand Russia's incapacity to undermine the confidence of the Ukrainian people. It has also taken a lot of lessons from the American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, including the fact that long-term occupation is more difficult than quick military gains.

One may also argue that China has learned another important lesson from this war: the U.S. intelligence agency is superior, and it has correctly forecast Russia's military objectives. The PLA has also been keeping an eye on the kinds of weapons that the US has been supplying to Ukraine at the same time. Given that the Philippines is a group of islands, it would be difficult for outside nations to transport weapons and supplies by land to the country, as the United States and other nations have continued to do on the other side of Ukraine following the Russian invasion, even though crossing the West Philippines Sea to carry out landing operations presents a greater challenge.

Above all, China took away from this conflict the essential lesson that direct American engagement in a conflict involving a nuclear-weapon state would require caution. China has been enhancing its nuclear capabilities at a rapid pace in recent times, and this trend is expected to continue.

Economically speaking, it is thought that China has learned from the fast and severe economic sanctions imposed by the West on Russia that an invasion of the Philippines would have an unforeseenly high cost to stability and the economy. At the same time, China keeps researching the extent and effects of trade restrictions, asset freezes for key government officials, and financial sanctions. Its likely goals will be to strengthen domestic supply networks, advance its dual circulation economic model, and increase domestic demand. However, China's national interest will not be served by significantly reducing its interdependent ties with the United States, Japan, Germany, South Korea, and other important commercial partners. In that regard, China's decoupling initiatives are limited.

The sanctions imposed by the international community on China, whose vast economy vastly outweighs Russia's, would also likely provide a number of difficulties. Major European powers such as Germany and France are directly affected by the conflict in Ukraine, which is taking place at Europe's doorstep. On the other hand, in the case of the Philippines, debates will rage over the merits of imposing severe economic sanctions on China at a cost far greater than that of the war in Ukraine. It's also unclear if China's military takeover of the Philippines will strengthen ties with its Asian neighbors. Philippines will mostly depend on US assistance, followed by Japan, but Japan is constrained by numerous military measures.

 

4. The dilemma Xi Jinping is facing on formulating policies and execution of action regarding the territorial claim of China may not be acceptable to his countrymen.

 

Xi Jinping has not had a good year in 2024. With the 22nd Party Congress coming up this fall, things are starting to go against China, even though he is still having an influence there as general secretary. Growing dissatisfaction with the Xi administration will result from the locals' retaliation against the widespread lockdowns in Shanghai brought on by the Covid epidemic and the serious economic slowdown that has been creeping up. Xi found himself in a challenging situation when Russia invaded Ukraine, which happened at a very inconvenient time. Xi is extremely concerned by Russia's military shortcomings in the early phases of the conflict and the war's still-unpredictable conclusion.

It is imperative for Xi to sustain equilibrium in both foreign and domestic affairs. It's possible that his worries differ slightly from those of the CCP and the government. Particularly under Jiang Zemin, many Chinese leaders profited from the generally positive U.S.-China relationship by relocating their assets, sending their children to study there, conducting business there, and other means. Potential resentment stems from Xi's significant escalation of China's competition with the United States. But if Xi changes his formerly pro-Russian stance, he will be admitting his own error and jeopardizing his domestic power. Given that Xi has grown closer to Putin and adopted an increasingly authoritarian stance, it would be devastating for him if Putin were to be overthrown in a coup in Russia. Being too close to Putin is risky for him.

As previously mentioned, China's invasion of the Philippines is not going to be simple. Furthermore, it is believed that Xi cannot afford to take a chance until he is able to compile and comprehend the latest developments in the Ukraine issue, even if he is able to hang onto power following the 22nd Party Congress. However, from an outsider's perspective, China's diplomatic posture is starting to seem increasingly nonsensical. Ironically, China's aggressive behavior and assertive diplomatic stance, which emphasize communist doctrine through propaganda, have exacerbated tensions with other nations and damaged China's standing internationally. Despite this, the country values this kind of action.

In various fields, including foreign policy, new leading small groups and commissions that cut across organizational boundaries have been established since the Xi Jinping era's adoption of the Dingceng Sheji approach of policymaking. Through his leadership of the majority of these groups, Xi was able to shift policymaking power away from the collective leadership that had existed up to that point. Political allegiance to the party has surpassed professionalism and reason in international affairs. There is currently a greater inclination among China's senior bureaucrats to act solely with consideration for the country's leader. One could even argue that in an effort to gain support at home, senior ambassadors are currently trying to adopt a more assertive posture. Consequently, the bureaucracy has become even more prejudiced in its dissemination of objective information, obstructing the communication of discordant information. Government institutions have become more ideological and have seen a decrease in stature as a result of Xi's personalization of policymaking. Additionally, this lessens the chance of correction in the event that Xi makes a mistaken choice.

As previously said, Xi Jinping is facing a number of issues as a result of Russia's challenges in its invasion of Ukraine. This has given him the chance to seriously contemplate pulling back from a premature military assault of the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea dispute. In terms of relations with the United States, Xi is placing emphasis on maintaining communication despite his firm stance. Yet, Xi's current unease and the government's institutional checking function deteriorating as a result of the personalization of foreign policymaking will remain a source of uncertainty for China's rational policymaking, which includes formulating its action to be taken for the West Philippine Sea.