Dr. Rodolfo John Ortiz Teope
Introduction:
When the
world woke up to images of tanks rolling into Ukraine in February 2022, it
wasn’t just Europe that shuddered—it was every democracy standing beside a
bigger, bolder, authoritarian neighbor. Thousands of kilometers away, in
Southeast Asia, Filipinos couldn’t help but ask: Will China do the same to us
in the West Philippine Sea?
This isn’t
just a political or diplomatic question—it’s a human one. It’s a question of
sovereignty, of safety, of everyday life in a region that has long lived with
the uncomfortable truth: the sea that feeds us, shelters us, and defines our history is also a potential battlefield.
This essay
explores how China is navigating the messy consequences of Russia’s war on
Ukraine and what that means for its future actions toward the Philippines. Can
the lessons learned from Kyiv prevent a conflict in Palawan? Can global sanctions slow down
China’s ambitions? Is Beijing simply waiting and refining its strategy?
1. China’s
Diplomatic Juggling Act: Friends with Putin, Business with the West
China
didn’t invade Ukraine. But when Putin did, Beijing didn’t exactly slam the door
shut either. Instead, they shook hands—just weeks before the first missile
struck Ukrainian soil—with a declaration of a “no-limits” friendship. That
move, symbolic and strategic, sent a chilling message to the West: two of the
world’s most powerful autocracies were standing shoulder to shoulder (Lee &
Zhang, 2023).
But China’s
handshake with Russia was more complex than it seemed. On one hand, China
benefits from cheap Russian oil and increased bilateral trade. On the other hand, China’s biggest trading partners remain the United States and the European
Union—countries that viewed Russia’s invasion as a violation of everything
modern diplomacy stands for (Huang, 2023).
Therefore, Beijing attempted to navigate a delicate situation. The country refused to call the situation an "invasion." It abstained
from UN votes. It offered a peace plan in 2023 that, to much of the world, felt
more like a performance than a solution (UN Watch, 2023). At home, China's state media echoed Russia's narrative, accusing NATO and Washington of pressuring Putin into war.
However, Xi Jinping and his team were aware, even in private, that they couldn't fully embrace Russia without facing potential economic repercussions from the West. They
needed to keep the U.S. talking. They needed Europe to keep buying Chinese
goods. And they absolutely needed to avoid becoming the next Russia on the
sanctions list.
2.
Beijing’s View of the World: Not Chaos, Just Transition
While the
rest of the world saw the Ukraine war as a turning point—a shift back to Cold
War tensions—China saw it as confirmation. To the Chinese leadership, this
wasn’t a surprise; it was a signal that the U.S. was getting desperate to hold
on to its fading power (Mendoza, 2024).
Even before
the war, China’s foreign relations were souring. The COVID-19 pandemic had
already frayed ties. Then came the U.S.-led AUKUS and the revitalized QUAD,
grouping Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. to challenge Chinese influence
in Asia (Kuo, 2023).
All of this only confirmed Beijing's pre-existing belief that the West was attempting to contain China's rise.
And yet,
China was careful. While it remained sympathetic to Russia, it also noted that
many Global South countries didn’t join Western sanctions. India, Brazil, even
some African states chose neutrality. This gave Beijing a sense of validation.
If it ever found itself isolated, it would still have friends—or at least,
partners who wouldn’t rush to condemn it.
3. West
Philippine Sea: A Flashpoint That’s Too Familiar
Now, let’s
bring it closer to home.
To most
Filipinos, the West Philippine Sea is more than a map. It’s history,
livelihood, and identity. China views the West Philippine Sea as an integral part of its "territorial integrity," unaffected by international law or the 2016 Hague ruling (Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines, 2023).
The world sees parallels between Ukraine, a sovereign democracy, and the Philippines, which also faces similar challenges. The
Philippines? The same. And like Putin, Xi has used history and national pride
to justify his country’s territorial claims.
But here’s
where it diverges.
Unlike
Russia, China hasn’t invaded. Not directly. Not yet. However, Beijing has been actively assessing the situation. Literally. From harassment of
Filipino fishermen to militarized islands and creeping installations, the signs
are there. Then there’s the influx of Philippine Offshore Gaming Operations
(POGO) and rising incidents of criminality tied to Chinese nationals. These
aren’t coincidences. They’re soft tactics, meant to destabilize from within.
But
Ukraine’s resilience and the West’s response may have given China pause. The
logistical nightmare of crossing a sea, occupying islands, and dealing with a
population that has tasted democracy—like the Filipinos—makes the risk far
greater than it seems (Abella & Santos, 2024).
And there’s
one more difference: the Philippines has the U.S. behind it.
4. Learning
from War: Ukraine as China’s Strategic Case Study
The Chinese
military has studied every move Russia made—and failed to make. The delayed
offensives. The equipment failures. The morale collapsed. And they took notes.
China
understands now that wars aren’t won with firepower alone. They need speed,
control, and the element of surprise. If Beijing ever chose to invade, it would
need to strike fast and finish faster—before the world could react. But even
then, what happens next?
Ukraine
showed that resistance doesn’t need tanks—it needs will. And the Philippines,
with its archipelagic geography and decentralized communities, presents a
guerrilla warfare nightmare. China also knows that U.S. intelligence, satellite
surveillance, and cyber capabilities are top-tier. There would be no hiding
(Xu, 2023).
Then
there’s the economy. Russia got slammed with sanctions. Banks frozen. Oligarchs
cornered. If that happens to China—an economy far larger and more embedded in
global trade—the fallout could be catastrophic. China knows this. And it’s
trying to build buffers: local supply chains, digital yuan, and trade with friendly
nations. But decoupling from the U.S., Europe, and Japan? Not anytime soon.
5. Xi
Jinping’s Personal Dilemma: Authoritarian Strength, Strategic Insecurity
Here’s the
twist in China’s foreign policy: it isn’t just national. It’s personal.
Xi Jinping
has concentrated power like no leader since Mao. He leads not just the party but also key commissions on military and foreign policy. That means fewer people to
say “no.” Fewer chances for course correction. And more danger if he gets it
wrong (Chan, 2024).
His
reputation took a hit during China’s harsh COVID lockdowns, especially in
cities like Shanghai. Economic growth has slowed. Youth unemployment is high.
Social media, though censored, is restless. And then came Ukraine.
If Xi
changes course too openly—pulls away from Russia, softens on the Philippines—it
could be seen as weakness. But doubling down carries risk, too. What if Putin
loses power? What if China faces real sanctions? What if a military move
backfires?
In an era
where diplomats are more aggressive than ever—earning the nickname “wolf
warriors”—objectivity and nuance are harder to find in Beijing’s foreign
ministry. Many bureaucrats now serve not policy, but politics. And it shows.
Conclusion:
The Storm Is Not Here—But the Clouds Are Gathering
So where
does this leave us?
For now,
China is watching. Waiting. Learning. The war in Ukraine has not killed
Beijing’s ambition, but it has slowed its timing. The lessons are too fresh,
the risks too high.
But this
doesn’t mean the Philippines can sleep easy. China hasn’t given up on the West
Philippine Sea—it’s just changing tactics. It will use economic pressure, cyber
influence, and political leverage before it fires a shot. And if it ever does,
the decision won’t be just about territory—it will be about pride, history, and
Xi Jinping’s legacy.
As
Filipinos, we must understand that the threat is not theoretical. It is real.
But so is our resolve. The best way to prevent conflict is not just to prepare militarily but to remain unified—politically, diplomatically, and
emotionally—as a people.
Because in
this new era of global power shifts, peace will not come from the silence of
guns alone, but from the strength of nations that refuse to be bullied.
References
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G., & Santos, R. L. (2024). The shifting sands of maritime security in the
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of Foreign Affairs, Philippines. (2023). On the 7th anniversary of the arbitral
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