*Dr. Rodolfo John Ortiz Teope, PhD, EdD, DM
I remember sitting quietly one afternoon, scrolling through my phone, watching a familiar scene unfold yet again. Someone had criticized the Supreme Court sharply, emotionally, and perhaps even unfairly. Within hours, defenders appeared. Not judges. Not justices. Ordinary citizens, keyboards in hand, furious in tone, declaring that a contempt case must be filed. As if the Court needed saving. As if offense alone was already a crime. That moment stayed with me, not because of what was said about the Court, but because of how quickly we confuse anger with justice.
That is where this analysis begins, through the eyes of a political whiner.
I speak not as a lawyer, nor as someone hiding behind legal technicalities, but as a private citizen, an educator, a former municipal legislator, a public safety and law enforcement professor and researcher, a political analyst, and a hopeless romantic who just recently found loving a siopao complex with a pancit curly noodle beauty, who has spent years observing how institutions behave under pressure. I call myself a political whiner not to trivialize the argument but to be honest about the role I occupy. Someone who complains because silence, when power is misused, feels like quiet consent.
When people hear "indirect contempt of court," they often assume it is about insult. About disrespect. About someone crossing an invisible line and bruising the pride of the judiciary. But contempt, especially indirect contempt, is not about feelings. It was never meant to be.
Indirect contempt exists for one reason alone: to protect the administration of justice. Not the ego of judges. Not the prestige of institutions. And certainly not the emotions of private citizens who feel compelled to be offended on the court’s behalf.
It is true that a private citizen may file a petition for indirect contempt. But this procedural allowance is frequently misunderstood and, at times, dangerously abused. Filing a petition does not mean contempt exists. It does not establish wrongdoing. It does not even obligate the court to act. At most, it is an invitation asking the court to take a second look. The existence of contempt begins and ends with the court itself.
This is because the offended party in contempt is never the filer. It is the court.
Courts are expected to endure criticism, even harsh criticism, even unfair criticism. A judiciary that collapses under dissent was never strong to begin with. Judges are not fragile officials who require constant public defense. If judicial authority is truly threatened, if justice is being obstructed, the court will recognize it without the need for intermediaries or self-appointed defenders.
This is precisely why the present indirect contempt petition involving Senate President Tito Sotto deserves careful public attention. The petition was triggered by his public criticism of a Supreme Court ruling, criticism delivered in his capacity as a political stakeholder responding to a constitutional controversy. Whether one agrees with his tone or not, the core question is not whether the Court was embarrassed or disagreed with him, but whether his statements actually posed a clear and present danger to the administration of justice. Jurisprudence has long drawn this line carefully. Courts have consistently held that criticism, even intemperate criticism, is not contempt unless it creates a real risk of obstructing judicial proceedings or undermining judicial authority in a substantive and imminent way. To treat political disagreement as contempt is to confuse dissent with defiance and commentary with coercion.
If criticism alone is now to be treated as indirect contempt, then intellectual honesty requires consistency. By that logic, I myself must also be guilty. I have written this analysis and other articles openly. I have examined, questioned, and even agreed with the statement and principle articulated by Senate President Tito Sotto in disagreeing with the Supreme Court’s decision. If academic critique, policy commentary, and principled disagreement are enough to constitute contempt, then every educator, researcher, columnist, and thinking citizen becomes vulnerable. That conclusion is not only absurd. It is dangerous. It transforms contempt from a narrow judicial safeguard into a broad instrument of silence, where agreement with a dissenting view becomes punishable not because it obstructs justice, but because it dares to question power.
The danger begins when criticism alone is treated as contempt. When courts are urged to cite individuals simply because their words are uncomfortable, embarrassing, or politically inconvenient, the line between justice and intimidation erodes. Debate gives way to fear. Dissent becomes silence. Citizens begin to measure their words not by truth, but by personal risk. When contempt is misused this way, it no longer protects the judiciary. It shields power from accountability.
There is an even deeper danger that must be confronted. When private individuals repeatedly invoke indirect contempt against critics without any real obstruction of justice, the court itself risks being bastardized. It becomes an unwilling instrument of harassment, dragged into personal vendettas, political rivalries, and loyalty tests. The judiciary was never meant to be a venue for political score settling or personal grievance airing. When it is used this way, judicial dignity is not defended. It is quietly eroded.
At the same time, it must be said clearly. The absence of a private filing does not weaken the court. If an act or publication genuinely undermines judicial authority or obstructs the administration of justice, the court, guided by law, experience, and institutional wisdom, may act motu proprio. In such cases, contempt is not triggered by outrage but by necessity. The court acts not because it feels insulted, but because justice itself is at risk.
This is why speech-based indirect contempt carries the highest threshold. Words alone, no matter how sharp or provocative, are not enough. There must be a real, clear, and present danger to the administration of justice. Not imagined. Not emotional. Real.
Often, the most misunderstood judicial response is silence. Silence is mistaken for fear, weakness, or tolerance of disrespect. But more often than not, silence is restraint. And restraint is not surrender. It is confidence.
In a democracy, institutions prove their strength not by how quickly they punish criticism, but by how calmly they withstand it. When a court chooses not to react, it may not be because it failed to notice the criticism. It may be because it understood that not every loud voice deserves the full weight of judicial power.
So yes, I am a political whiner. I complain because I care. I question because I refuse to confuse authority with infallibility. And I believe that the judiciary is strongest not when it silences its critics, but when it shows the discipline to rise above them.
That, to me, is the true meaning of indirect contempt. No offense. Not pride. But restraint in the exercise of power.
__________________
*About the author:


