An Analysis on China's Challenges Affected by the Russia-Ukraine War in Relation to the Territorial Claim of the West Philippine Sea
by
Dr. Rodolfo John Ortiz Teope
There is still bloodshed
in Ukraine as a result of Russia's invasion. It's probably too early to draw
any conclusions or give China any guidance because it's impossible to predict
how this conflict will end at this point. After Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine
in February 2022, nations imposed harsher sanctions on Russia; yet, it was
evident that Putin still had a strong ally in Xi Jinping. Weeks before the
full-scale invasion, the Chinese leader announced a "no limits"
alliance with Russia, rejecting the sanctions and fortifying his relationship
with Putin. The two leaders' economies have become more intertwined as a result
of the war; last year, commerce reached record heights as Russia increased its
imports of vital commodities from China and Chinese consumers snatched up cheap
Russian petroleum. Russia's military industrial base is fueling its conflict in
Ukraine, according to accusations made by the United States, and official data
supports these claims with significant growth in related items. These products
include machine tools and microelectronics. China has consistently maintained
that its commerce with Russia is a normal aspect of their bilateral
relationship. It further states that it takes a neutral stance toward the
conflict and just seeks to bring about peace. Nevertheless, there is no denying
that China has had to deal with a lot of difficulties as a result of Russia's
actions and the international community's reaction. This paper will discuss the
issues China is experiencing in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, with a focus
on how it has affected China's action against the Philippines with regards to
the territorial claim of the West Philippine Sea.
1. The complications between Russia and
the western nations is a situation that China must consider with regards to a
balance foreign policy.
China has been impacted
by the war in Ukraine in a number of areas, including military, economic,
political, and international relations. China has struggled to strike a balance
in its foreign policy between Russia and the Western nations. China has refrained
from characterizing Russia's assault on Ukraine as an “invasion” a move that
has drawn harsh criticism from Western nations. Following a confidential
meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, a joint statement from China and
Russia said that the friendship between the two States has no limits. China's
biggest trading partners, the United States and the European Union, must also
be taken into account. Although it first adopted a largely pro-Russian posture,
it appears to have gradually changed its mind in light of later events on the
front lines. At the moment, China finds it dangerous to be too near or too far
away from Russia.
China's party,
government, and state-run media have all essentially adopted a Russian line on
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, arguing that the major reason for the conflict is
that Russia's security is at risk due to NATO's eastern expansion, which is
being spearheaded by the United States. China has attempted to create a rift
between the U.S. and Europe because it believes that the U.S. is supporting
Europe's firm position toward Russia. Even Germany, which historically and
strategically is wary of Russia, chose to forgo approving the economic
developmental project in favor of continuing to support Ukraine militarily.
China appears to have underestimated the robust solidarity and lightning-fast
response of Europe and America to Russia's activities.
Although Xi Jinping
continues to adopt a tough stance against the U.S., stability in its relations
with Washington is China’s top priority. China wants to avoid becoming a target
of U.S.-led international sanctions, and for now, even though it continues to
offer diplomatic moral support to Russia, it has been refraining from providing
military aid overtly. Although the U.S.-China confrontation has been a
structural one in nature, China’s bottom line is probably to continue dialogue
with the Biden administration in some way, if not to improve relations
dramatically, at least to maintain a predictable and stable relationship.
2. The perspective of China on Present-Day
International Affairs is a factor that needs to be revisited.
China does not see the
current state of international relations as a major structural shift, but
rather as the possibility that the war in Ukraine may have some impact on the
current international order. China's basic position, which is based on its forecast
of the long-term decline of US national power, its confidence as a major power
with its rising national power, and its rivalry with the Western-centered
international order through the expansion of its influence on the developing
countries—of which there are a far greater majority than the advanced
nations—has remained largely unchanged, despite its growing caution towards
rapid changes in the international situation.
As an impartial matter,
following the global expansion of the Covid epidemic, China's foreign
relations, especially those with the West, were getting more hostile even prior
to the war in Ukraine. In this period, the Biden administration has
strengthened steps against China, including launching AUKUS and fortifying QUAD
in Asia and the Pacific, and restored U.S. connections with its European
allies, which were strained under the Trump administration. Invitations to the
NATO meeting went out to Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and Japan. China
has protested these moves and expressed concern that they could turn into an
Asian NATO. On the other hand, one may argue that Xi Jinping's firm foreign
policy stance—which prompted the concerned nations to adopt a more
confrontational posture—was the real cause of these acts.
China, meanwhile, does
not necessarily believe that it is alone in the globe. It is assiduously
following its national interest, abstaining from giving Russia military
assistance, and applauding the fact that a large number of poor nations
abstained from voting in favor of UN resolutions denouncing Russia. It is
especially happy that China sent envoys on an unexpected visit to India a QUAD
member, choosing not to impose sanctions against Russia.
3. The Fundamental Position of China
territorial claim must be address properly.
For a while, there was
debate over how China's claim to ownership of the West Philippine Sea, despite
of a UNCLOS ruling allowing the Philippines to use the body of waters as its
Exclusive Economic Zone, somewhat relates to Russia's reason of the invasion of
Ukraine. These two situations do, after all, share two characteristics:
democracies coexisting with more powerful authoritarian neighbors and the
propensity of major power leaders to highlight ancestry and blood ties.
However, the Ukraine issue is quite distinct from the China-Philippines issue
from China's perspective because the West Philippine Sea is a part of China as
the Chinese Government asserts based on historical facts.
To date, there is no
convincing evidence that China's core long-standing attitude on claiming the
West Philippine Sea has changed as a result of the conflict in Ukraine. One
could argue that China will reconsider employing force in the West Philippine
Sea given the challenges Russia faced shortly after the conflict in Ukraine
began. The likelihood of China launching a unilateral armed invasion of the
Philippines in the near future has decreased, as China now has a plethora of
challenges and scenarios to weigh. Still, this is not the same as stating that
China will abandon its claim to the WPS. It is still adamant about claiming
WPS, regardless of how long this takes. Anyway, this determination to assert
WPS will not be affected by economic sanctions.
Stated differently, the
Chinese leadership views a Philippine invasion resulting from the WPS issue as
a high-level political choice that goes beyond military and economic logic and
impacts the future of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) dictatorship. This is
not a matter that is decided just by the evaluation of the People's Liberation
Army's (PLA) effective landing operation in the Philippines. That is to say,
the Chinese leadership may still authorize an armed operation if they believe
it is required, even in an undesirable scenario where military success is not
certain and if delaying military action will have a significant negative impact
on geopolitics or internal politics. It must be understood that if Philippines
crosses the red line and fire the first bullet, China is ready to use force any
time.
Regardless of the Ukraine
war, the long-term gap in the military power of China and Philippines will
continue to widen. From the Chinese leaders’ standpoint, time is on China’s
side, so it can be argued that there is no need to take hasty military action.
Even before the Ukraine invasion, there were actions by China which manifest
that an invasion of Philippines could be imminent. However, discussions among
security officials in the Philippines who need to prepare for the worst
scenario in the future are not necessarily on the same dimension as the
question of whether the Chinese leadership will indeed decide to launch an
armed invasion.
Threat is the result of
intent and capability, but as intent is difficult to discern from the outside
and varies over time, capability is typically given more attention. Without a
doubt, China has been acting more aggressively in the last few years, as seen
by the PLA air force's regular breaching of the economic zone in the West
Philippine Sea. Incorporate also the intermittent establishments of Philippine
Offshore Gaming Operation (POGO) around the various Philippine provinces whose
effect is highly damaging the peace and order of the country. However, the
relationship between the United States and China over the Philippines remains a
dynamic aspect of international politics. China views the U.S.'s previously enforced
self-restraint on the WPS issue as gradually eroding even with the Biden
administration, as evidenced by the frequency with which U.S. naval vessels
transit the Philippine seas and the expansion of the Enhance Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and the U.S. government exchanges with Philippine
authorities at the governmental level. This will cause significant
dissatisfaction among rightists and the Chinese military, which will put some
pressure on Xi Jinping. Even to the conflict in Ukraine, tensions between the
United States and China over the Philippines had been steadily rising. China
also understands that, in contrast to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the
prospect of American military action must be considered in the event of an
invasion of the Philippines.
3. The military and economic takeaways of
China once they decided to invade the Philippines.
China, however, has
gained significant military and economic insights from the conflict in Ukraine.
China was astounded by the challenges Russia encountered early in the conflict
and its inability to secure a resounding victory. It seems to be annoyed that
the conflict has made the Philippines more of a contingency in the eyes of the
world and has increased awareness of defense issues in the country.
Even prior to the
conflict in Ukraine, China was well aware of the difficulties and dangers
associated with military activities in the West Philippine Sea. It is
considerably more difficult to cross the West Philippine Sea and launch a
landing operation than it is for Russia, which is invading Ukraine across a
national border via land. China needs to accomplish its takeover and achieve a
clear victory quickly in order for the world community to react, if it decides
to use military force. Additionally, even after occupation, long-term
resistance is anticipated to persist in the Philippines. China has seen
firsthand Russia's incapacity to undermine the confidence of the Ukrainian
people. It has also taken a lot of lessons from the American wars in Afghanistan
and Iraq, including the fact that long-term occupation is more difficult than
quick military gains.
One may also argue that
China has learned another important lesson from this war: the U.S. intelligence
agency is superior, and it has correctly forecast Russia's military objectives.
The PLA has also been keeping an eye on the kinds of weapons that the US has
been supplying to Ukraine at the same time. Given that the Philippines is a
group of islands, it would be difficult for outside nations to transport
weapons and supplies by land to the country, as the United States and other
nations have continued to do on the other side of Ukraine following the Russian
invasion, even though crossing the West Philippines Sea to carry out landing
operations presents a greater challenge.
Above all, China took
away from this conflict the essential lesson that direct American engagement in
a conflict involving a nuclear-weapon state would require caution. China has
been enhancing its nuclear capabilities at a rapid pace in recent times, and
this trend is expected to continue.
Economically speaking, it
is thought that China has learned from the fast and severe economic sanctions
imposed by the West on Russia that an invasion of the Philippines would have an
unforeseenly high cost to stability and the economy. At the same time, China
keeps researching the extent and effects of trade restrictions, asset freezes
for key government officials, and financial sanctions. Its likely goals will be
to strengthen domestic supply networks, advance its dual circulation economic
model, and increase domestic demand. However, China's national interest will
not be served by significantly reducing its interdependent ties with the United
States, Japan, Germany, South Korea, and other important commercial partners.
In that regard, China's decoupling initiatives are limited.
The sanctions imposed by
the international community on China, whose vast economy vastly outweighs
Russia's, would also likely provide a number of difficulties. Major European
powers such as Germany and France are directly affected by the conflict in Ukraine,
which is taking place at Europe's doorstep. On the other hand, in the case of
the Philippines, debates will rage over the merits of imposing severe economic
sanctions on China at a cost far greater than that of the war in Ukraine. It's
also unclear if China's military takeover of the Philippines will strengthen
ties with its Asian neighbors. Philippines will mostly depend on US assistance,
followed by Japan, but Japan is constrained by numerous military measures.
4. The dilemma Xi Jinping is facing on formulating
policies and execution of action regarding the territorial claim of China may
not be acceptable to his countrymen.
Xi Jinping has not had a
good year in 2024. With the 22nd Party Congress coming up this fall, things are
starting to go against China, even though he is still having an influence there
as general secretary. Growing dissatisfaction with the Xi administration will
result from the locals' retaliation against the widespread lockdowns in
Shanghai brought on by the Covid epidemic and the serious economic slowdown
that has been creeping up. Xi found himself in a challenging situation when
Russia invaded Ukraine, which happened at a very inconvenient time. Xi is
extremely concerned by Russia's military shortcomings in the early phases of
the conflict and the war's still-unpredictable conclusion.
It is imperative for Xi
to sustain equilibrium in both foreign and domestic affairs. It's possible that
his worries differ slightly from those of the CCP and the government.
Particularly under Jiang Zemin, many Chinese leaders profited from the
generally positive U.S.-China relationship by relocating their assets, sending
their children to study there, conducting business there, and other means.
Potential resentment stems from Xi's significant escalation of China's
competition with the United States. But if Xi changes his formerly pro-Russian
stance, he will be admitting his own error and jeopardizing his domestic power.
Given that Xi has grown closer to Putin and adopted an increasingly
authoritarian stance, it would be devastating for him if Putin were to be
overthrown in a coup in Russia. Being too close to Putin is risky for him.
As previously mentioned,
China's invasion of the Philippines is not going to be simple. Furthermore, it
is believed that Xi cannot afford to take a chance until he is able to compile
and comprehend the latest developments in the Ukraine issue, even if he is able
to hang onto power following the 22nd Party Congress. However, from an
outsider's perspective, China's diplomatic posture is starting to seem
increasingly nonsensical. Ironically, China's aggressive behavior and assertive
diplomatic stance, which emphasize communist doctrine through propaganda, have
exacerbated tensions with other nations and damaged China's standing
internationally. Despite this, the country values this kind of action.
In various fields,
including foreign policy, new leading small groups and commissions that cut
across organizational boundaries have been established since the Xi Jinping
era's adoption of the Dingceng Sheji approach of policymaking. Through his
leadership of the majority of these groups, Xi was able to shift policymaking
power away from the collective leadership that had existed up to that point.
Political allegiance to the party has surpassed professionalism and reason in
international affairs. There is currently a greater inclination among China's
senior bureaucrats to act solely with consideration for the country's leader.
One could even argue that in an effort to gain support at home, senior
ambassadors are currently trying to adopt a more assertive posture. Consequently,
the bureaucracy has become even more prejudiced in its dissemination of
objective information, obstructing the communication of discordant information.
Government institutions have become more ideological and have seen a decrease
in stature as a result of Xi's personalization of policymaking. Additionally,
this lessens the chance of correction in the event that Xi makes a mistaken
choice.
As previously said, Xi Jinping is facing a number of issues as a result of Russia's challenges in its invasion of Ukraine. This has given him the chance to seriously contemplate pulling back from a premature military assault of the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea dispute. In terms of relations with the United States, Xi is placing emphasis on maintaining communication despite his firm stance. Yet, Xi's current unease and the government's institutional checking function deteriorating as a result of the personalization of foreign policymaking will remain a source of uncertainty for China's rational policymaking, which includes formulating its action to be taken for the West Philippine Sea.